Abstract: We present a theory explaining how divergent opinions about the regulation of an externality problem can lead to distrust of both political institutions and other people. Those who are more concerned about the externality distrust the government because they perceive the rule as too lenient. Those who are less concerned blame the government because they have to comply with a rule they deem useless. In addition, the rule shapes individuals’ expectations of civic behavior in society. Therefore, regulation can lead to disappointment and interpersonal distrust when others do not follow the rules. Those who are more concerned also value civic behavior more, so they lose even more trust in others. Our survey experiment in four European countries supports these patterns in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.
28 Marzo 2025
Andrea Martinangeli - Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas
Externalities and the erosion of trust
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