Bridging the gap between the strategic and cooperative approaches is recognized as a fundamental issue of game theory. Attempted resolutions of this issue, well known as the Nash program (Nash, 1953), have provided many different strategic bargaining mechanisms that sustain the Shapley value at equilibrium. Such mechanisms fit and unify the two approaches, allowing the players who face an allocation problem to bargain in a restricted way, and to converge to a stable solution without the need for an intermediary.
We experimentally implement different well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure. In particular, we focus on the comparison of the demand-based Winter’s demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players’ effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
19 Maggio 2023, 12:30 - 13:30, Aula Marrama