Thesis title: Il binomio riservatezza-sicurezza nei pagamenti elettronici con moneta privata e nelle valute digitali di banca centrale
The purpose of this research is to understand if, within the context of the European regulatory framework applicable to electronic payments, there is room for the anonymity of payments based on central bank digital currencies (CBDC) and what is its extent. The ability to perform anonymous transactions seems, in fact, a highly sought-after feature of a potential CBDC, not only because of the need to ensure the privacy of the users’ payment data, but also to guarantee the attractiveness of the new instrument compared to the traditional physical public money (i.e. cash). However, as emphasized at the international and European level, anonymity in payments is often related to money laundering, financing of terrorist operations and tax evasion and, thus, it should be reduced to circumscribed cases and balanced by specific measures addressing higher fraud and ML/FT risks.
In this context, finding adequate answers to such demand for a higher degree of confidentiality in CBDCs’payments is of the foremost importance, given that the CBDC project of the Eurosystem and the Commission, the so-called “digital euro”, is at an advanced stage of investigation and the European institutions are assessing the need for an ad hoc legislative regime for the new digital currency.
As highlighted in the research, the evolution of the rules applicable to payment services and instruments proves that anonymity not only hinders the need to comply with the principles underpinning the payment and money laundering legislation, but also that actually there is no such thing as a totally anonymous payment instrument.
Specifically, the research underlines that the evolution of the European rules applicable to electronic payments – above all the PSD2 and the AMLD – has gradually and steadily reduced the space for anonymous transactions, balancing the privacy of the users with the public need to prevent frauds and to contrast money laundering and financing of terrorism.
In light of the above, the Author believes that, at EU level, the introduction of an entirely anonymous digital euro would be neither feasible, nor coherent with the rules applicable to other electronic payments instruments, since digital euro users would be protected to a lesser extent and anonymity would give room to an undesirable regulatory arbitrage between public and private payment solutions. Conversely, the proportionality and the risk-based approach already embedded in the European legislation should be explored with a view to level the playing field: the digital euro could become the secure and confidential payment expected by European consumers and businesses, only if it is based on the same combination of confidentiality and transparency observed in the regulation of payment transactions with private money.