Thesis title: The Thing in Itself as a Thing in General. A Reassessment of the Distinction Between Appearances and Things in Themselves in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
The purpose of the research undertaken is to offer an interpretation of the concept of ‘thing in itself’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, from its first introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic up to Chapter III of the Analytic of Fundamental Propositions and, thus, the end of the Transcendental Analytic.
Part I provides an overview of the literature on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. It is divided into three chapters, devoted respectively to the early reception of Kant’s distinction in the figures of Jacobi, Fichte, and Maimon; to some notable Neo-Kantian interpretations, particularly those of Cohen, Windelband, and Adickes; and to a critical review of the contemporary debate.
Part II is devoted to the distinction between appearances and things in themselves and is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 offers a discussion of some notable aspects of Kant’s logical apparatus that are both relevant and useful for approaching the text of the KrV. Chapter 2 addresses some additional necessary historical premises. Finally, chapters 3 and 4 offer a reading of portions of the Transcendental Aesthetic (II.3) and of Chapter III of the Analytic of Fundamental Propositions (II.4) that is compatible with and informed by the contents of Chapters 1 and 2.