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**Impact of globalization and use of violence within
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Abstract

The multidimensional phenomenon side of globalization has had a more evident economic face failing to keep up with global governance. The unprecedented openness in trade, finance, travel and communication has also created new opportunities for organized crime such as the Italian mafias or the Mexican drugs cartels. The present paper first deals with either the characterization of the globalization as disruptive phenomenon and its effects in organized crime. The history and development of criminal groups in both countries, Mexico and Italy, will be subsequently examined. Some features of the Neapolitan Camorra mafia and the emergent Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) of Mexico will be eventually analyzed more substantially. These shortlisted criminal associations have used violence as a central mechanism in their criminal development, but with different degrees and modalities. In fact, the Mexican cartels use violence in an unprecedented measure not only against rivals, but also challenging the State. Camorra instead seems to be in another criminal level in which violence is the last resource. Both, however, have used violence in an instrumental way, but also as a symbolic instrument of power. The present paper is part of a wider PhD research going through an empirical study in two Naples and Mexico City neighborhoods, where the Camorra and the CJNG are actives.

INTRODUCTION

Mexico and Italy have in common, beside the foreseen and known differences, the presence of organized crime groups with a high-rate young people involved in their illegal activities and that have been adapted to the “new era” of globalization with more or less success.

This “new era” has been characterized by unprecedented openness in trade, finance, travel and communications that has created economic growth and (not for all) well-being, but has also given rise to massive opportunities for criminals to make their business prosper (UNODC, 2010).

During the past 30 years, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the globalization has found practical expression in the economic reforms adopted by rich and poor countries. At the same time, organized crime has got more diversified, become global and achieved international proportions (Naim, 2006, UNODC,2010)

For some authors all was accelerated with the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet empire dissolution. Thus, with the globalization the illicit commerce has been changing the world by transforming economies, reshaping politics, and badly affecting governments.

According to Moisés Naim, the illegal traffics have changed throughout a three-pronged sequence: they have enormously increased in value, enlarged their products and activities and changed their traditional specializations to give priority to brokers instead of producers. The result of these

transformations has been a radical reorganization of the illegal traffics in order to become more competitive, productive and efficient (Naim, 2006).

But globalization has also increased inequality around the globe, and “its disruptive effect has actually caused people’s addiction to go into organized crime and operate as in illicit markets as coping mechanisms” (Williams, 2012).

The present paper is based on a few more relevant assumptions. First, Italian mafias and Mexican drugs cartels are organized criminal groups that have adapted to globalization.

The second hypothesis is that some particular criminal groups of both countries, as the Neapolitan Camorra, and the Mexican Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), have characteristics in common, such as the use of violence to achieve their criminal goals and use it as a control mechanism.

The Camorra is considered one of the most violent Italian mafias, responsible for almost half of the mafia murders in the country over the last 20 years (Massari and Martone, 2019). On the other hand the CJNG was declared in 2015 by the Mexican government one of the country’s most dangerous cartels. And in 2016 the U.S. Department of Treasury described the group as one of the world’s most prolific and violent drug trafficking organizations (Beittel, 2020).

In both groups use of violence has an important symbolic meaning and communicational impact. However, it has been adopted throughout different forms and degrees.

In fact, Camorra prefers the use of corruption as a more effective tool for achieving its goals and, more particularly, affecting the work of local politicians. In addition, the Neapolitan Mafia seems to be in that criminal range in which after the (illegal) capital accumulation success, it has now partially entered the legal economy (Wallerstein, 2013; 88) and at that point the use of violence is its last resource.

Instead, the CJNG, is apparently in a transition point from a traditional hierarchical criminal group to a fully a networked organization, and use violence for impose its power not only against other cartels, but also in front of the governmental repression.

1.- THE GLOBALIZATION DISRUPTION

Globalization has been at the core of the sociological debate in the last decades and even though it is a multidimensional phenomenon, for some authors it can be better understood starting with its economic dimension. According Manuel Castells “a global economy has its core activities work as unit in real time in a planetary scale. Thus capital markets are interconnected worldwide, so that savings and investment in all countries depend for their performance on the evolution and behaviour of global financial markets” (Castells, 1999;4).

For diverse scholars the globalization commenced with the beginning of the colonialism and the capitalism system itself in the 16th century (Wallerstein, 2013). This perspective, known as the World-systems theory, refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labour, which divides the world in core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery countries. The first nations focus on higher skill capital-intensive production, while the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labour-intensive production and extraction of raw materials (Lechner, F. 2001).

Despite its roots are old, the last decades process represents a qualitative new reality and in part it has been the result of the information technologies revolution and the communication progress.

Globalization includes different processes such as technological change, economic and financial liberalization, industry deregulation, large access to information technology, and the increasing importance of the private sector.

But globalization is not a definitive condition and faced with a complex constellation of theoretical and semantic definitions we use the proposition that characterized it as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999; 16).

According with this definition, the spatial reach of this global interrelation will result in the generation of various networks of relationships between communities, states, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations and multifunctional corporations.

As it was already anticipated, although the most evident face of globalization is the economical one, with the free movement of capitals there has been also a political, cultural and technological process that have diffused since at least 50 years with the communication system development (Giddens, 2000; 23).

In the ideological way, globalization has meant the determination aim to build an extreme capitalism, without external interferences and with power diffused throughout the society. It is an unlimited capitalism that has created many opponents (Touraine, 2008; 34)

Yet globalization not only involves the big systems such as the world financial order, and not only touches things that are outside and far from individuals. Globalization is also an internal phenomenon with influences throughout people’s lives.

According to the British sociologist Anthony Giddens, the whole process has been pressing for the local autonomies, with the paradox emergence of new nationalisms and fundamentalisms. In fact, on the one hand we have the globalization poles being the fight between dependence and autonomy, and on the other hand there is the confrontation between cosmopolitan mentality and fundamentalism.

Authors, such a Zygmunt Bauman, said that the last part of the 20th century was characterized as a “the big war of the space independence” during which the main decisional centres began a separation from the ties that localization processes had imposed. (Bauman, 2001).

One of the most important globalization’s consequence is the end of the territorial traditional sovereignty, also because a global economy erodes the national economy and national-State basis and enables multinational companies to act without the restrictions of the politics and the social State (Beck, 2001).

The global diffusion of multiples waves of Western liberal ideology and its technologies has created a world of “softened” sovereignty or “ungoverned spaces”, that are viewed as a social, political and economic territories where states do not exercise “effective sovereignty” or where state control is absent, weak or contested. In these arenas the territorial state control has been voluntary or involuntary ceded in whole or part to other actors, like organized crime. (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010; 17)

Moreover, the global diffusion of neo liberalism also altered the global trading and financial orders to create a new form of political economy in which states has allowed private actors, particularly in finance, to put together an enormous power.

With globalization the State has become not interventionist but promoter and facilitator of foreign investments and national exportations. At the same time, private companies have created transnational groups associated with financial networks that get real time information with the new informatics technologies (Touraine, 2008; 32).

In short, globalization has undermined state sovereignty with the effect that also the most powerful states must contend with the interest of private actors in the efforts to govern.

At the same time, globalization has deeper affected the social structures. In the most industrialized countries, the traditional working class has undermined or is undermining with the territorial based mass production.

Furthermore, one of the most globalization's negative effects is the increasing inequality in all the world. In fact, according statistics, the global income of the fifth poorest world population passed from the 2,3 per cent in 1989 to the 1,4 per cent in 1998 (Giddens, 2000; 28)

Globalization has enormous distributives effects in income and wealth and has created winners such as multinational corporations and financial institutions in the large advanced countries, but also a losers and not only in developing countries (Stiglitz, 2017) and it is seen as a determinant factor for increasing unemployment.

1.1 The Globalization of Crime

The globalization process has had also effects upon the criminal scene. However, in the last years the theoretical debate has distinguished at least three formulations: “crimes of globalization”, “globalization of crime” and “globalization and crime”.

The concept of crimes of globalization are those demonstrably harmful policies and practices of institutions and entities (as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund) that are specifically a product of globalization. Instead, globalization of crime refers in general to long-standing forms of crime now implemented in a global context and the third term refers more widely to the influence of globalization on crime, in a conventional definition.(Rothe and Friedrichs, 2015)

In this paper we refer first and foremost to the globalization of crime because the criminal networks also get great advantages out of the international mobility and, in conjunction with it, organized crime has diversified by going global and reaching macro-economic proportions.

In 1998 Michel Camdessus, the then International Monetary Fund (IMF) director, estimated that the global “dirty money” flow was about from 3 to 5 per cent of the world economy, but more recent numbers have estimated that the “dirty money” for recycling is about the 10 per cent of the world gross domestic product (Naim, 2006;19)

In the recent debate about organized crime, experts remark that criminal groups are taking advantage of globalization (Castells 2000, Williams 2004) and there is no doubt that the world expansion commerce, with an average annual growth of approximately 6 per cent during the last years of the XX century (IMF, 2001), has created an enormous space for the illicit traffics. Actually, the same measures to promote legal commercial exchanges, have been also an advantage for the illegal traffickers, as the open borders or the elimination of custom controls.

This situation shows on one hand the expense of crime and how it has become indissolubly linked to the world economy, and on the other how the underworld uses legal institutions, as banks, trade and communications networks for illicit scopes.

For the UNODC a non-exhaustive list of the transnational organized crimes main activities are drugs trafficking, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, firearms trafficking, environmental resources trafficking, counterfeit goods trafficking, maritime piracy and cybercrime.

The term “organized crime” firstly appeared in the 19th century and was used in United States to indicate connections with plumbers conspiring to raise prices and collusion between city officials and brothel owners in New York, with a lynching mob in Barnwell, South Carolina, with revolutionary movements in Europe and with the Camorra in Naples (Varese, 2010). In 1919 the term was used in reference to the contraband alcohol gangs existed in that period in Chicago, but since then it has evolved in line with its manifestations.

For some scholars, an organized crime group is an enterprise getting its income by unlawfully controlling the production and sale of a certain commodity or service that may or may not be itself illegal (Varese, 2010).

According to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC), “organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefits” (UNODC, 2003)

A more complete definition says that organized crime is “a form of criminal activity occurring within a social system composed of a centralized or decentralized social network (or networks) of at least three actors engaged in an ongoing criminal enterprise in which the size, scope, leadership and structure of the networks is generated by the ultimate goal of the enterprise itself (i.e. how the crime is organized). This goal take advantages of opportunities generated by laws, regulations, and social customs and mores and can be pursued for financial profit and/or the attainment of some form of power to effect social change and/or social mobility via the leveraging and brokering of the network’s social, political and economic capital. Members of the network can be from the underworld or upperworld. In some forms, force and/or fraud are used to exploit and/or extort victims, while in the others illicit goods and services are provided by members of the network to customers in a marketplace where such activity is often permitted through the establishment of practices which foster the compliance and/or acquiescence of corrupt public and private sector officials who receive remuneration in the form of political favours or in the form of direct or indirect payoffs” (Albini and McIllwain, 2012; 81-82).

According to the UNCATOC the definition of “transnational organized crime” embraces offenses committed in more than one state, and includes as well those committed in one state but planned or controlled in another one. This definition still encompasses crimes in one state committed by groups that operate in more than one state, and offenses committed in one state but with implications or impact on other states.

The latest waves of globalization have been an opportunity and also a challenge for traditional organized crime groups, as the Italian mafias, that have been involved in transnational trafficking for years. But globalization also has advantaged smaller, more flexible groups or networks and in some cases organized crimes seems to be more a matter of a group of an illicit activities in which

some individuals are involved, and less a phenomenon of a groups of individuals who are implicated in illicit activities (UNOCD, 2010).

2.- THE ITALIAN MAFIAS AND THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS

“Organized crime” is a term variously applied to Mexican drug cartels, fraudulent city banks and the street-level drug business. Instead, “Mafia” is an Italian term that has historical roots in Sicily, but it is also a form of organized crime, and is a method that can create the existence of this form of crime in any time, and any place (Albini, McIllwain, 2012;31).

Particularly, the mafia is a form of organized crime that could infiltrate the legal economy and politics, by gaining a certain social acceptance and some measure of tolerance by the authorities (Lupo, 2008). Mafia is also considered as a “specific form of power exercise, based on a specific solid vision of social relationships” (Dalla Chiesa, 2016) and a “specific type of organized crime group that has the capacity to exercise power at a local level throughout a systematic intimidation and/or political influence” (DNA, 2017).

Some scholars define the mafia as a subtype of organized crime group that strives to control the market in a multilayer way and sells protection to crime groups to avoid competition and possibly law-enforcement as well (Varese, 2010).

But the complexity of the globalization phenomenon demands conceptual clarification about the Italian mafias’ and Mexican cartel’s definition as a transnational organized criminal groups. In fact, some authors have criticized the concept of “transnational organized crime” and make a clearer distinction between isolated episodes of money laundering and long-term transplantation (Varese, 2011).

According to this perspective, the world transplantation means “the ability of a mafia group to operate an outpost over a sustained period outside its region of origin and routine operation” (Varese, 2012; 6) and not all the transplantation attempts are successful.

For Diego Gambetta, the Italian mafia (particularly Cosa Nostra) “is a difficult industry to export” because it is heavily dependent on the local environment (Gambetta, 1993; 249).

However, several studies have established that the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian Ndrangheta, the Neapolitan Camorra, the Mexican cartels and other organizations have come together in a global, diversified network (Castells, 2000; 167).

In fact, for these authors, with globalization the mafias are less rooted in a specific territory and have become more inherently transnational (Castells, 2000; Williams, 2004).

In a recent report, the DIA (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia) argued that Italian mafias have now become “liquid” (DIA, 2016), but according to Federico Varese, in this context “liquidity” does not refer to the availability of cash but instead to a version of modernity where control of a territory has been superseded by a rather unspecified fluidity (Varese, 2011; 4).

Nonetheless, globalization increases the capacity of mafia organizations to purchase the resources that they need without having to move, and at the same time, they never lose contact with their local

territory, clan or family of reference, which remain the origin of their power and are both their strength and their weakness (Europol, 2013).

As reported by the former Italian Antimafia Prosecutor, Franco Roberti, “over the past twenty years, Italian Mafia-type associations have evolved into formations that are rapidly spreading across regional and national borders, often in alliance with foreign groups” (Roberti, 2014).

These criminal synergies have promoted the global expansion of illegal activities that presumes the existence of organized structures, as drugs and weapons trafficking, human trafficking; smuggling or cybercrime.

Under those perspectives there is no doubt that the Italian Mafias are part of the transnational organized crime; they have become global by nature and their international connections are a real menace to the world’s legal, political and economic institutions.

Nicola Gratteri, the Catanzaro’s (Calabria Region) Prosecutor, stressed that the annual revenue of the four principals criminal organizations in Italy (Cosa Nostra from Sicilia, Ndrangheta from Calabria, Camorra from Naples and Sacra Corona Unita from Puglia) is almost 9,5% of the Italian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Gratteri and Nicaso, 2006: 15)

Since the 70’s some experts have portrayed the Mafia (Cosa Nostra) as the sum-all criminal organization having monopoly of rackets in the United States and around the globe (Albini and McIllwain, 2012).

As far as Diego Gambetta is concerned, selling protections has been the central task of the Cosa Nostra and this activity emerged as a result of the fear of some Sicilian businessmen that they could not trust their competitors (Gambetta, 1993). In other words, these businessmen need to buy the protection of mafia members in order to safeguard and protect their business interests.

In accordance with the aforementioned perspective, Mafiosi are first of all entrepreneurs that use violence as a means, not an end, because actually their business is sell that particular commodity – protection- and this makes them different from simple criminals. However, as Gambetta notes, protection can be a genuine commodity and have a specificity as lubricant of economic exchanges.

Nonetheless, other authors have stressed that is not possible characterize the Mafioso phenomenon from an unique standpoint, as Gambetta suggests. According to Letizia Paoli in the last 100 years the Mafia’s members have used the force from their associative link in order to follow the most different goals and the most dissimilar functions (Paoli, 2000;9).

Under this perspective, Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta (Paoli does not analyse the Camorra) are secret and multifunctional brotherhoods, each of them composed of about one hundred units called families, but these units are certainly distinct from the latter’s blood families. According to Paoli, the aforementioned groups are “neither economic enterprises aiming at the maximization of profits nor an industry of private protection and cannot be considered an universally valid ideal type of organized crime if it is understood as the provision of illegal goods and services” (Paoli, 2000; 298-299).

As it was observed by Albini and McIllwain, much of the confusion regarding Mafia is linked with the description made for writers, describing it as an organization or secret society that can be transferred from one country to another. Instead, these authors said that Mafia is first of all a method that can be applied throughout any social system.

The Mafia term emerged in 1863, in the popular theatre play entitled “I Mafiosi della Vicaria”, a Palermo’s jail. In 1865 other reference appeared in an official document: a Sicilian policeman wrote that a man had arrested for complicity in a “mafia crime” (Gayraud, 2007; 80).

Instead, the term Cosa Nostra was first used in 1963 by Joseph Valachi, the major government witness against the American Mafia, during the McClellan hearings, investigated organized crime activities across United States (Albini and McIllwain, 2012; 51). He disclosed unknown information about the structure, operations, rituals and membership of the American Mafia and then the term “Cosa Nostra” was extended to nominate also the Sicilian counterpart.

The Sicilian Cosa Nostra became, within a historical model, a permanent reference about what an organized crime is, but its genesis is rather uncertain. The latest explanation about it has found its origins in two XIX century historical phenomena: the feudalism disintegration and the insular landlordism. In opposition to the Naples power, the rich Sicilian landowners use to make reference to their private guards (the Gabelotti) in order to repress the peasants’ revolts. These enriched guards would have conquered they autonomy and created Cosa Nostra.

The others principal Italians mafias, the Ndrangheta from Calabria, and the Camorra, from Naples, have modern origins also within the XIX century (Gayraud, 2007; Albini and McIllwain, 2012) .

‘Ndrangheta name could be a definition from the classic Greek and precisely from the term “andragatizomai”, that means “courageous man” and in Calabria a similar modern criminal organization emerged during the formation of the Italian state process, in the XIX century (Gratteri and Nicaso, 2006).

According to Gratteri, the ‘Ndrangheta is nowadays one of the world’s most globalized and powerful criminal organizations, with an annual revenue of about 36 billion Euros, which is equivalent approximately 3.5% of GDP of Italy.

The main difference with Cosa Nostra is that the Ndrangheta recruit members throughout the blood relationship criterion, and this characteristic results in an extraordinary cohesion within the family clan (Gratteri and Nicaso, 2006).

Instead, the Camorra is one of the oldest and largest criminal organization in Italy and although dating the 17th century, its more modern version is from the 19th century.

In fact, the first official prove about the Camorra’s existence as organized entity was a policy report in Naples in 1820 about a street gang that had become a more structured group (Gayraud, 2007).

Although the Camorra is the Europe’s criminal entity with more affiliated members (Saviano, 2006), it has never had the unified and relativity homogenous structure of Cosa Nostra. Irrespective, the Neapolitan mafia has been characterized by the instability of its architecture, the continuing fights between gangs and its dimension which can be rated almost as a street delinquency.

But the most important change happened in 1970, when Raffaele Cutolo founded the “Nuova Camorra Organizzata” in the region of Campania. Known by the initials NCO, the organization was created with the intention of renewing the old rural Camorra and in 1980 had become the strongest Camorra clan with more than 10,000 members and one of the most powerful organizations in the country (Sciarrone, 1998).

However, in the latest seventies La Nuova Famiglia, a dissident group led by Michele Zaza, questioned the Cutolo’s power and that resulted in the “first Camorra’s war”, with more than 1,500 deaths between 1977 and 1988 (Gayraud, 2007).

The Camorra's main business are drug trafficking, racketeering, money laundering and trafficking of toxic residues and since the early 1980's the organization has acquired a strong presence in other countries,

Between 1979 and 2005 more than 3,600 people were killed by the Camorra, that has made the organization become the most violent criminal groups in Europe (Saviano, 2006).

The Neapolitan mafia has important links in Spain, with the drug trafficking, and in China and Easter Europe for cigarettes smuggling and counterfeiting. Particularly, the Camorra has association with the Chinese criminal groups (Savona, 2011).

But Campania's Camorra is formed by a galaxy of groups with differing characteristics "that replicate the development historically seen in the various territories in which they are rooted, taking on disparate features and using differentiated repertoires of action, and functioning within specific economic sectors" (Massari and Martone, 2019; 3). For these reasons, many experts prefer to use the term Camorras, in the plural, instead of Camorra.

However, use of violence and terror has always been a peculiar characteristic of Italian Mafias behaviour as a control method (Massari and Martone, 2019). Violence has been one of the most distinctive features of the Mexican drugs cartels as well, and it has reached a highest and more articulated level as opposed Italian mafias.

The Mexican drug cartels are, nonetheless, more clearly linked with the transnational sphere as they use first of all trafficking drugs to the international market, particularly United States, and for some scholars they have been consolidated by their adaptation capacity to globalization, their network organization and their complicity with the legal world. Furthermore, through many alliances they are present not only in Latin American or Europe, but also in China (Alda Mejias, 2018).

Particularly, in parallel with the globalization disruption (or as a result of it), Mexico was weakened by the implosion (at the beginning of the 21th century) of its senescent one-party regime (without the development of the strong democratic institutions needed to replace it) and in this scenario criminal groups have been easily able to obtain the upper hand.

A report from the Mexican Commission of Human Rights has calculated that the "War on Drugs", began in 2006, during the Government of President Felipe Calderón, caused in 10 years almost 150,000 deaths, 27,000 missing persons and 35,000 refugees, but in accordance to different NGO's, the casualties calculated by May 2018 showed a record of 250,000 victims (Pardo Veiras, 2019).

According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA's) annual Drug Threat Assessment, these organizations continue to diversify into crimes of extortion, human smuggling, oil theft and, first of all, as we said above, they produce a traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl (Beittel, J. 2020).

Mexican drug cartels have been in constant transformation, and the State action not only increased violence and instability among the groups, but also has fragmented some organizations with the empowerment of others. In 2006 four cartels were dominant: the Sinaloa Cartel, The Tijuana Cartel, the Juárez Cartel and the Gulf Cartel.

At present the DEA has identified 9 main cartels: the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, Tijuana, Juárez, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).

The origins of the drug cartels in Mexico can be traced to the end of the 19th century and have been closely linked with the geopolitical Mexican position and its proximity with the United States, that nowadays is the largest cocaine market in the world and one of the biggest on marijuana (UNODC, 2020).

In 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act, that barred the majority of Chinese migrants from entering the USA, had caused that they decided to settle down in Mexico, specifically in the northern states, and introduced opium in the region (Murphy and Rossi, 2017)

From the beginning of the 20th century both opium and marijuana were grown in Mexico and exported to the USA and certainly the Revolution of 1910 created a political turmoil that took many years to settle, giving a relevant environment for criminal activities.

During the 1920's and 1930's the prohibitive legislation did not end the exports of drugs to USA, but the drug industry of Mexico boomed. At that time the first small drug cartels were emerged. Actually, "prohibition" fostered the illegal trafficking and created the firsts Mexican "capos".

World War II changed the world stage and caused that countries involved in the conflict, as the USA itself, needed unprecedented amount of narcotics such a morphine for wounded soldiers. Washington asked Mexican authorities to allow for legal production of marijuana and opium poppy plants in 1940 (Toro, 1995).

By 1943, opium was Sinaloa's main cash crop and its cultivation was extended to other Mexican States. At the same time, marijuana crops extended its presence in the northern and central states (Medel, 2012).

Since World War II Mexico was a major source of marijuana for the American market, and in the 1970's became also an important origin of heroin. In the 1980's the Guadalajara cartel consolidated its power with an alliance with others smaller cartels (the Sinaloa cartel, the Sonora cartel, the Tijuana cartel, the Juarez cartel and the Gulf cartel), and in 1989 the arrest of Miguel Angel Gallardo Félix, the "capo" of the new powerful group, sparked violence and a war for control of territory and trafficking routes.

But the Mexican drug Cartels power was increased after the downfall of the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels in the 1990's, when the Mexicans took control of the illicit drug market and the routes to the USA.

Today, the mayor Mexican drug cartels handle more than one type of drug according to the U.S. State Department's 2020 "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Mexico is a relevant source and transit country for heroin, marijuana and synthetic drugs (such as methamphetamine and fentanyl) destined for the United States and the main trafficking route for U.S bound cocaine from Colombia, Perú and Bolivia (Beittel, 2020).

In this context, the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), that made its first appearance in 2011 with the mass murder of 35 alleged members of Los Zetas (a rival criminal group), has grown into a dominant force in many states and also has extended its influence to Mexico City.

The CJNG is based in the west-central Jalisco state, has early roots in the Milenio Cartel, that operated before 2010 in the southern Mexico, and with the violence has replaced the historic cartels

from the Pacific Mexican Coast. In less than a decade, the criminal group has extended its links in some countries of America, Asia and Europe and in 2020 the U.S Government considered the cartel its “biggest criminal drug threat” (Montes and Córdoba, July 8 2020).

2.1 Use of Violence by Mexican and Italian Criminal Groups

Italy and Mexico are affected by the transnational criminal power for an historical reasons and its geopolitical position and although both countries have important transnational criminal groups, the differences between and among Italian mafias and Mexican drug cartels are numerous.

First, while Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra have a vertical hierarchy and the Camorra is horizontal organized, the Mexican drug cartels, once also centralized, have been forced to decentralize after the arrested or killed of its more important drug lords (Corrado, 2013).

This has caused a fragmentation with the cells of the network have been acting independently in order to maintain effective operations.

So, most Mexican drug cartels are now organized in a “Decentralized Cell Structure”, a term coined by analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt for describe a system in which there is a low grade of hierarchy, with the possibility of multiple leaders and the decision-maker process decentralized (Dishman, 2005).

Furthermore, although violence is a characteristic of both Mexican drug cartels and Italian mafias, there is a difference in the degrees and scope of the violence in itself.

Violence is a very complex phenomenon and it has been historically used by criminal groups, mostly because of lack of alternative control systems accessible to the kind of competitive activities that make up organized crime.

In fact, in 1876 Leopoldo Franchetti spoke about the Sicilian mafia as an industry of violence and about Mafiosi as entrepreneurs of violence (Dino, 2019).

According to Philip Williams, “when it comes to criminal organizations trafficking illicit commodities, violence is always latent and often manifest, but is not integral to the criminal activity (...) (Rather) criminal organizations operate outside of the law and cannot resort to law to settle disputes with rivals, to deal with recalcitrant employees, or to obtain redress for grievances. Instead they rely on the use and threat of violence for security (to protect markets, routes, and other strategic assets associated with their trafficking activities), internal order (to maintain internal discipline and punish those guilty of infractions) and power (to expand their market share)” (Williams, 2009; 325)

In this paper we refer specifically to the Camorra, that has been one of the most violent mafias in Italia (Saviano, 2006; Massari and Martone 2019). However, as we said above, it is better refers to it in plural, as Camorras, because it is not a homogeneous entity but a group of criminal gangs that replicated the features and behaviour historically adopted in the different territories in which they are rooted (Massari and Martone, 2019).

Some scholars distinguish between provincial Camorras and urban Camorras. The last ones are present in the city of Naples and confined in separate neighborhood, where they are involved in illicit trafficking, extortion and other illegal activities.

Thus, this model use violence in different degrees and professionalism and it (violence) has taken different bloody forms in diverse historical moments. For example, at the beginning of the 21th century, during the “faida” of Scampia (the neighborhood in the north of Naples) between the Di Lauro family and a breakaway faction (the “secessionists”) caused a peak of homicides.

But, as Massari and Martone say, the Camorra clans can use violence to create social relations and infrequently appeal to the explicit use of it when they can cooperate with criminal, political and economic figures. Furthermore, the Camorra and the other Italian mafias seem to be in a post-capitalist accumulation phase described by different authors, such Immanuel Wallerstein, in which the use of violence is the last resource. The main interest of these criminal groups is then to become legal entrepreneurs (Wallerstein, 2013).

Mafia violence, however, has different aspects. It not only observes a practical manifestation, but also “has a highly symbolic meaning: it is an economic resource through which wealth is produced, but also a social and cultural resource, important in creating consensus, a reputation and legitimacy inside and outside the organization” (Sciarrone, 2019; 72).

That is, Mafiosi give economic value to violence and see it as a instrument for social and cultural affirmation but first and foremost turn it as a foundation of power.

As Sciarrone stressed, for Mafiosi “violence is not a mere instrument of power but rather a form of power, that is a violence that overlaps with power, charged as it is with meaning and provided with the ability to structure reality” (Sciarrone, 2019; 75).

The Camorras organizations are, however, more similar to the Mexican drug cartels than the other Italian Mafias. In fact, as in some Mexican cities - where the stronger drug cartels are rooted -, chaos and violence, at times uncontrolled, frequently characterize the criminal Neapolitan scenario, with the substitution of some of the historical clans for new ones “often formed out of youths with no reference points and no real historical criminal identity who, initially anonymous delinquents, have taken over the territory thanks to their daily use of violence, which is more openly displayed than ever and is used as a tool to affirm themselves and subjugate others, but also to launch challenges towards adversaries” (DIA, 2017).

As a some scholars stressed, drug markets, specifically cocaine and heroin ones, are very violent; many participants are at risk of being killed or wounded by others in the same business, either as buyers or sellers, and there are shooting or innocent bystanders (Reuter, 2009).

Particularly, the use of violence is central in the CJNG strategy, and the criminal group has been involved in high profiles attacks against public officials, as the recent attempt (June 2020) on the head of the Mexico City police, Omar Garcia Harfuch, in the most important “avenida “of the Mexican capital.

The criminal group, headed by Nemesio Oseguera “El Mencho”, has evolved as a result of killings, captures and rifts in older cartels, and has been associated with the use of extreme violence. In fact, in the period following its emergence, the homicides, forced disappearances and discoveries of mass graves notably increased in the Jalisco state.

Further, the CJNG uses a sophisticated media strategy, including social media, to heighten the impact of its strikes and according Mexican authorities, it has infiltrated Mexico City allied with local and smaller cartels.

Official statistics have shown an absolute increase of violence since 2007, when the “War on Drugs” was launched and according to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) homicides jumped 57 per cent in 2008, 41 per cent in 2009, 30 per cent in 2010 and 5 per cent in 2011.

In fact, many studies about the Mexican “War on Drugs” have provided evidence indicating that government repression substantially contributes to the escalation of violence and have found that the growth in the phenomenon has come primarily from a jump in the fraction of homicides that are associated with organized crime, and specifically with the trafficking of illicit drugs (Shirk and Wallman, 2015).

Some authors have offered a “centripetal” approach by explicating that law enforcement disrupts the relative military balance among drug cartels by weakening a criminal organization and indirectly improving the position of its rivals. This improvement might increase violence because a competing group could invade the territory of the weakened one (Osorio, 2015).

“Paradoxically, the overall empirical analysis of the Mexican war on drugs suggests that government efforts to provide public security by aggressively confronting organized criminals exacerbate violence between those groups and spread conflicts to neighboring areas” (Osorio, 2015; 1427).

According to some experts, the domestic drug market in the Mexican landscape remains small, so it is possible to attribute the majority of the violence to the export and trans-shipment trade, and the phenomenon cannot be analyzed without reference to the chronic corruption that has long plagued Mexico’s drug control (Reuter, 2009).

As well, intensified enforcement may be an important factor for the violence, because it causes considerable turn-over in the leadership of the principal drug trafficking groups (many leaders have been incarcerated or killed) and increases inter-gang conflict. On the other hand, “the dismissal of large numbers of corrupt officials creates uncertainty and hence violence as traffickers search for new sources of protection” (Reuter, 2009).

The drug cartels use specific types of weapons (AK- and AR-style rifles, grenades), tactics (street gun battles, assassinations of law enforcement, agents, journalists and simple civilians) and extreme and symbolic forms of violence (torture, decapitation, dismemberment). They also use to send “narcomensajes” or messages to authorities and rivals by hanging bodies from bridges and other modalities and normally like to post truculent images in social networks in a method called “mediatic violence” for some scholars to grab headlines and capture public attention.

All this “constitute a form of communication, a deterrent and an attempt to terrorize rivals, government officials and the public” (Shirk and Wallman, 2015; 1354). It is without a doubt a form to affirm power and control in the different territories where these groups are present.

In that sense, we can say that the CJNG is a prototype of the transnational criminal organization rapidly and violently rising to become one of the most powerful drug cartels in Mexico and the world, with an expert use of brutal violence and social media, spectacular displays of “narcomensajes”, military tactics and efficacious narco-trafficking strategies.

CONCLUSIONS

During the last 30 years, the globalization process has changed the spatial organization of social relations and transactions. Their different extensity, intensity, velocity and impact provoked new transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power wielding. Globalization has found practical expression in the economic reforms adopted by rich and poor countries, and, meanwhile, organized crime has reconsidered its strategy, becoming global and achieving international proportions.

The world expansion commerce has created considerable room for the illicit traffics and the very same measures, to promote legal commerce exchange, have been an advantage for the illegal traffickers. Organized criminal groups, as the Italian mafias or the Mexican drug cartels, have been benefiting from this aforementioned process.

The debate about what is organized crime refers it as criminal groups that function as enterprises getting their income by unlawfully controlling the production and sale of a certain commodity or service that may or may not be itself illegal. Also it is defined as a form of criminality activity occurring within a social system composed of a centralized or decentralized social network (or networks) of at least three actors engaged in a ongoing criminal enterprise.

Historically rooted in a specific territories, the Italian mafias are a subtype of organized crime and have become “liquid” because their territorial control has been superseded by a rather unspecified territory.

Although Italy and Mexico have important transnational criminal groups, the differences between Italian mafias and Mexican drugs cartels are remarkable. The former ones have a more centralized hierarchy, and the latter ones have been forced to decentralize the power after their important drug lords have been arrested or killed.

Both Mexican drug cartels and Italian mafias have used violence as a form of power and in an instrumental way for social and cultural affirmation, but also give it a highly symbolic meaning as a deterrent or as a tool in creating consensus, a reputation and legitimacy.

However, while Italian mafias are now oriented to use violence as the last resource, in Mexico the violence of the drug cartels has reached highly magnitude, while government repression and corruption substantially contribute to the escalation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, diverse studies have found that the growth in the use of violence has come primarily from a jump in the fraction of homicides that are associated with organized crime, and specifically with the trafficking of illicit drugs.

The Camorra (or Camorras) mafia is the Italian organization more similar to the Mexican criminal groups not only because its horizontal structure, but also because the Neapolitan clans are often formed out of youths with no reference points and no real historical criminal identity who, initially anonymous delinquents, have taken over the territory with their use of violence, which is more openly displayed than ever and is used as a tool to affirm themselves and subjugate others, but also to launch challenges toward adversaries.

Particularly, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) have been their countries' most violent groups. But this model of using violence has either qualitative and quantitative differences. While Camorra clans use violence to create social relations and prefer to cooperate with criminal, political and economic figures, the CJNG uses violence as a central

resource in its empowered strategy against other criminal groups. This criminal organization has targeted the elite of Mexican authorities, becoming a global threat.

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